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This paper studies a mechanism design model of financial intermediation. There are two informational
frictions: agents receive unobservable shocks and can participate in markets by engaging in trades
unobservable to intermediaries. Without regulations, intermediaries provide no risk sharing because
of an externality arising from arbitrage opportunities. We identify a simple regulation -- a liquidity
requirement -- that corrects such an externality by affecting the interest rate on the markets. We characterize
the form of the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement for a general class of preferences. We show
that whether markets underprovide or overprovide liquidity, and whether a liquidity cap or a liquidity
floor should be used depends on the nature of the shocks that agents experience. Moreover, we prove
that the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement implements a constrained efficient allocation subject
to unobservable types and trades. We provide closed form solutions for the optimal liquidity requirement
and welfare gains of imposing such requirements for two important special cases. In contrast with
the existing literature, the necessity of regulation does not depend on exogenous incompleteness of
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Abstract
This paper studies a mechanism design model of ￿nancial intermediation. There are two
informational frictions: agents receive unobservable shocks and can participate in markets by
engaging in trades unobservable to intermediaries. Without regulations, intermediaries provide
no risk sharing because of an externality arising from arbitrage opportunities. We identify
a simple regulation ￿a liquidity requirement ￿that corrects such an externality by a⁄ecting
the interest rate on the markets. We characterize the form of the optimal liquidity adequacy
requirement for a general class of preferences. We show that whether markets underprovide or
overprovide liquidity, and whether a liquidity cap or a liquidity ￿ oor should be used depends on
the nature of the shocks that agents experience. Moreover, we prove that the optimal liquidity
adequacy requirement implements a constrained e¢ cient allocation subject to unobservable
types and trades. We provide closed form solutions for the optimal liquidity requirement and
welfare gains of imposing such requirements for two important special cases. In contrast with
the existing literature, the necessity of regulation does not depend on exogenous incompleteness
of markets for aggregate shocks.
Keywords: Optimal Regulations, Financial Intermediation, Optimal Contracts, Market Fail-
ures, Mechanism Design.
1 Introduction
The role of ￿nancial intermediaries in providing liquidity is one of the central features of a modern
￿nancial system. Accordingly, the regulation of ￿nancial intermediaries is an important function of
central banks and is a topic of frequent debates in the policy-making community. In this paper we
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1answer several important questions. Can markets provide the correct amount of liquidity? What is
a precise nature of market failure if such exists? Can a regulator design a simple policy to improve
on the allocations provided by competitive markets alone? The questions of public versus private
provision of liquidity, limits of the markets in the provision of liquidity, and the role of government in
regulation of ￿nancial intermediation has been a subject of considerable volume of recent research.
Most notably, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Allen and Gale (2004) study models of provision
of liquidity in the presence of either informational or enforcement frictions.
We study a mechanism design model of ￿nancial intermediaries as providers of liquidity similar
to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (2004). In our setup, agents receive unob-
servable taste shocks.1 Intermediaries invest in short and long term assets and o⁄er a risk-sharing
contract that pools risk across agents. An environment in which the only informational friction is
unobservability of agents￿types is well analyzed in the literature. It is easy to show, as in Prescott
and Townsend (1984) and Allen and Gale (2004), that markets provide optimal allocations, and,
therefore, there is no role for government intervention.
The focus of this paper is on an environment in which there is an additional informational
friction: consumers can trade assets unobservably on a private market by engaging in hidden side
trades. Since the contribution of Jacklin (1987), the possibility of agents engaging in hidden side
trades has been recognized as an important constraint on the provision of liquidity by ￿nancial
intermediaries.2 Unobservability of consumption arising from a possibility of such trades is a
realistic and signi￿cant friction a⁄ecting liquidity. It is di¢ cult, if not impossible, for an individual
￿nancial intermediary to control the exact use of funds or consumption of an agent or preclude a
￿rm from engaging in bene￿cial trades with other ￿rms in the economy. A di⁄erent interpretation
of unobservability of consumption is non-exclusivity of contracts. It is di¢ cult for an individual
￿nancial intermediary to preclude an agent to enter in additional risk sharing contracts with other
intermediaries. Possibility of hidden trades can signi￿cantly worsen and even eliminate risk sharing.
For example, Jacklin (1987) and, more recently, Allen and Gale (2004) showed that absent any
government regulations, in an environment with unobservable trades, intermediaries provide no
risk sharing. Allen and Gale (2004) then conclude that, in the absence of aggregate shocks and
incompleteness of the markets for aggregate risk, there is no regulation that can improve upon the
market equilibrium.
In contrast to the literature, we propose and analytically characterize a simple intervention
that can improve upon the market allocations. We propose imposing a liquidity requirement that
stipulates either the minimal (liquidity ￿ oor) or the maximal (liquidity cap) amount of liquidity
￿holdings of the short asset ￿for an intermediary. Such regulation a⁄ects the interest rate on
the hidden trade market, relaxes incentive compatibility constraints, and improves welfare. Im-
1Agents in our setup can be also thought of as as ￿rms or entrepreneurs experiencing shocks to their productive
opportunities. The interpretation of our environment as a model of ￿rms makes the paper similar to the setup of
liquidity provision in the productive sector by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).
2The importance of access to credit markets as a constraint on the optimal program was also emphasized by Allen
(1985) and Chiappori, Macho, Rey, and Salanie (1994).
2portantly, we also show that the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement implements the e¢ cient
allocation in which the social planner is constrained by the unobservability of agents￿types and the
possibility of hidden trades. Therefore, the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement is not just the
best requirement within a particular class of interventions, i.e. within a class of liquidity adequacy
requirements. It is also an intervention that allows to achieve the highest possible welfare subject
to these two information frictions. We identify a reason for the market failure ￿an externality
in which intermediaries do not internalize how liquidity they provide a⁄ects other intermediaries
via the possibility of trades on private markets. Importantly, this externality exists even when
there are no aggregate shocks. This contrasts with the conclusions of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998)
and Allen and Gale (2004) that the government has a role in regulating liquidity only if there are
aggregate shocks.
A technical contributions of the paper is an analytical characterization of the optimal liquidity
regulation in terms of easily interpretable wedges and determination of the form of the optimal
regulation (liquidity cap or liquidity ￿ oor) for a general speci￿cation of preferences. We also provide
a closed form solution for the optimal regulation in two cases: for a setup with logarithmic utility
and for the environment studied by Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
We prove that the particular form of preference shocks one assumes is crucial to determine
the direction of the optimal liquidity requirement. The intuition for why a liquidity requirement
improves upon a competitive market allocation is that it a⁄ects prices (interest rates in our case)
on private markets. In short, a change in the interest rate a⁄ects the deviating agent who simul-
taneously claims a di⁄erent type and engages in hidden trades more than an agent who truthfully
announces his type, therefore, relaxing the incentive compatibility constraints. The direction of the
deviation depends on the speci￿cation of the preference shocks. In the case of the liquidity shocks,
a deviating agent wants to save. A liquidity ￿ oor reduces the interest rate and makes borrowing
less attractive. In the case of discount shocks, a deviating agent wants to borrow. A liquidity cap
increases the interest rate and makes saving less attractive.
Our model suggests practical implications for regulation of ￿nancial intermediation. Various
types of intermediaries or di⁄erent regions in a country, depending on the primary nature of the
shocks that the agents whom they serve experience, should have di⁄erent forms of liquidity regu-
lations. There are two appealing features of liquidity requirements that make it suitable for policy
implementation. First, it is simple to implement as it speci￿es only how much liquidity intermedi-
aries should hold in the ￿rst versus second period. Intermediaries are then left to determine how
they service their individual consumers without any additional government intervention. Second,
it does not shut down private markets. Rather, aggregate manipulation of liquidity endogenously
changes the interest rate on these markets.
We structure the paper to follow the discussion of equilibria and e¢ ciency concepts progressing
from less constrained to more constrained problems. The least restrictive program is an optimal
allocation subject only to feasibility constraint
￿
SP1￿
￿in this setup, there is no private information.
We then characterize a competitive equilibrium
￿
CE2￿
and a constrained e¢ cient allocation
￿
SP2￿
3in which the only informational friction is unobservable types. As we discussed above, the welfare
achieved by CE2 is equal to welfare achieved by SP2. We then describe a competitive equilibrium
￿
CE3￿
for the case when types are unobservable, and agents can also engage in hidden trades. We
characterize the form of the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement depending on the speci￿cation
of preferences. We then show that the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement implements the
constrained e¢ cient allocation SP3 in which a planner is constrained by two informational frictions
￿private types and hidden trades. Generically, welfare is higher in the solution to SP3 than welfare
achieved by competitive markets CE3. For an important special case, considered in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) and Jacklin (1986), competitive equilibria without regulations imply no risk sharing
and autarchic allocations while the optimal liquidity adequacy achieves welfare of the unconstrained
problem SP1 (in fact, the solutions to all three programs SP1, SP2, and SP3 coincide in this
particular case).3
2 Relationship to the literature
This paper builds on a large literature of risk sharing by in the presence of liquidity shocks (Diamond
and Dybvig 1983; Jacklin 1987; Bhattacharya and Gale 1987; Hellwig 1994; Diamond 1997; Von
Thadden 1999; Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2003; Allen and Gale 2003, 20044). More generally,
our paper ￿ts in the literature of optimal allocations with unobservable taste shocks following
Atkeson and Lucas (1992).
Our paper uses the mechanism design framework of an important paper by Allen and Gale
(2004) to analyze the model of intermediation in the presence of private markets. Our results in
the model with private markets di⁄er signi￿cantly from their work. The result of Allen and Gale
(2004) that an equilibrium is ine¢ cient relies on exogenously imposed incompleteness of markets
for trades among intermediaries when there are aggregate shocks. In the absence of incomplete
markets for aggregate shocks or in the absence of aggregate shocks, Allen and Gale (2004) conclude
that there is no role for regulation of liquidity or any other regulatory intervention. We show
that a liquidity requirement can improve upon the competitive equilibrium by eliminating above
described externality even when there are complete markets for aggregate shocks or when there
are no aggregate shocks. The mechanism of how liquidity requirements a⁄ects interest rates on
private markets and the characterization of the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement is new
to the literature on the provision of liquidity by ￿nancial intermediaries. Moreover, we provide a
theoretical characterization of the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement for a general speci￿cation
of shocks and closed form solutions for two important cases.
Our paper shares a common goal with the work of Allen and Gale (2004) in studying whether
laissez-faire markets provide too little or too much liquidity and whether a speci￿c policy interven-
3We use terminology SP
1, SP
2, and SP
3 to correspond to what in the literature is, somewhat imprecisely, called
￿rst-, second-, and third-best problems. The advantage of our notation is that we clearly de￿ne constraints that a
social planner faces.
4For a survey of the literature see Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Gorton and Winton (2002).
4tion that occurs at an aggregate level can be Pareto improving or even optimal. Both of the papers
direct regulations at intermediaries rather than individual consumers. A government regulates in-
termediaries while intermediaries on their own solve incentive problems via direct interactions with
consumers.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) provide a theory of liquidity in a model in which intermediaries
have borrowing frictions. Similar to our paper they do not assume incomplete markets. In their
model, a government has an advantage over private markets as it can enforce repayments of bor-
rowed funds while the private lenders cannot. They show that availability of government provided
liquidity leads to a Pareto improvement when there is aggregate uncertainty. The role of the gov-
ernment in our model is to correct an ine¢ ciency arising because of an externality associated with
private information and possibility of hidden trades. In our paper, in contrast with Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998) and Allen and Gale (2004), a liquidity requirement improves upon a market allocation
even when there is no aggregate uncertainty.
Our paper also di⁄ers conceptually from the seminal paper of Jacklin (1987). That paper
compares a competitive equilibrium with private markets
￿
CE3￿




which is, essentially, equivalent to the statement that prohibition of private
markets leads to a Pareto improvement. In our paper, we ￿nd the optimal liquidity requirement
and show that it implements the solution of the social planner￿ s problem who is faced with both
unobservable types and private markets
￿
SP3￿
which, for this speci￿cation of preferences, coincides
with SP1 and SP2. In contrast with Jacklin, there is no need to prohibit private markets to
achieve superior or even unconstrained allocations. A regulator can impose a liquidity adequacy
requirement that achieves such optimal allocations.
Lorenzoni (2006) considers a Diamond-Dybvig model of banking with ￿nancial markets. His
results on the characterization of the optimum is similar to our results for the special case of
Diamond-Dybvig setup. The focus of Lorenzoni (2006) is on the models of money and on im-
plementation of the optimum and advantages of various policy interventions. In his model, a
speci￿cation of technology for intertemporal transfer of resources allows him to consider tradeo⁄s
of various policy interventions. Another paper that is related to our results in the Diamond-Dybvig
setup is Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003). They develop a model of an emerging market crisis
in which there is a market for external borrowing and a domestic private market. The domestic
market in their model is similar to the private market in our formulation. They show that the
equilibrium coincides with the optimal allocation in the presence of private markets. They further
show that a range of ￿nancial instruments including liquidity requirements and taxes on external
borrowing can implement the optimal allocation without private markets that coincides with the
full information optimum. In our general model, a competitive equilibrium with the optimal liq-
uidity adequacy requirement is di⁄erent from the competitive equilibrium without private markets
and, therefore, is di⁄erent from unconstrained "￿rst-best" allocation. However, we show that in
a special case of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) environment, the optimal liquidity regulation
implements the unconstrained optimum.
5While the focus of this paper is on the models of ￿nancial intermediation, we also contribute
to the literature on optimal taxation in the presence of hidden trades5. In particular, Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2006) study an optimal dynamic Mirrlees taxation with endogenous private markets.
There are two main di⁄erences between our paper and their work. The ￿rst di⁄erence is conceptual.
In Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) as in most of the models of dynamic Mirrlees taxation (see,
e.g., Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski 2003 or a review in Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning
2006 and Kocherlakota 2006), private information (skill shocks) is dynamic and separable from
consumption. The ine¢ ciency of the competitive equilibrium in Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006)
arises because of the dynamic nature of the private shocks. In our model, private information does
not change stochastically over time, and the ine¢ ciency arises due to non-separability of shocks
and consumption. The second di⁄erence is in the extent of the results that we obtain. Golosov
and Tsyvinski (2006) and Bisin et. al. (2001) are able to identify only the direction of a local
policy change that leads to a Pareto improvement. We characterize the optimal allocation in the
presence of private markets and show that the optimal liquidity regulation implements the optimum
SP3. We derive an analytical solution for the interest rate associated with the optimal liquidity
requirement in terms of an easily interpretable wedge depending on the speci￿cation of preferences
and distribution of shocks. Moreover, we provide a complete closed form solution for the optimum
for two important examples. Studying optimal rather than locally improving interventions is not
only interesting from the theoretical point of view. Optimal interventions may achieve a signi￿cant
improvement in welfare compared to the competitive equilibrium. For example, we show that in the
case of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) the optimal liquidity requirement implements the unconstrained
optimum.
Related is a recent paper by Albanesi (2006) that studies a model of entrepreneurship and
￿nancial assets. The focus of that paper is on an implementation of the optimal program with
observable consumption as a competitive equilibrium with taxes in which agents can trade multiple
assets. She derives a general result on di⁄erential asset taxation in such models.
In Diamond (1997), as in our paper, the optimal allocation is di⁄erent from autarky. His
result relies on the assumption that some consumers are exogenously restricted from participating
in private markets. Unlike that paper, in our model all consumers can participate in markets.
An elegant paper by Bisin and Rampini (2004) justi￿es an institution of bankruptcy in a model
of non-exclusive contracts. In their work, borrowers (entrepreneurs) have an access to secondary
markets. A possibility of default on these secondary contracts worsens return to hidden borrowing
and lending and yields a Pareto improvement.
One justi￿cation for reserve requirements is found in the existence of deposit insurance. The
rationale given is usually as follows: deposit insurance encourages risk taking behavior of intermedi-
aries (see, e.g., Merton 1977) which can be controlled by requiring intermediaries to hold adequate
5See, for example, Arnott and Stiglitz (1986), (1990), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), and Hammond (1987).
Several recent papers such as Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (2004) and Bisin, et. al. (2001) showed in very general
settings that economies with asymmetric informations are ine¢ cient and argued for Pareto-improving anonymous
taxes.
6levels of liquidity. In this argument, existence of one potentially suboptimal policy, deposit insur-
ance, justi￿es necessity of another policy - reserve requirements. Typically, this literature, with the
exception of Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (1998, 2000), does not consider optimal policy in the
absence of deposit insurance. This literature also does not pose a friction or a market failure and
does not ￿nd an optimal policy that can be deposit insurance, reserve requirement, some combina-
tion of those, or maybe neither. Our results on the optimality of reserve requirements do not rely
on the existence of any other exogenously given policy.
3 Model
We consider a standard mechanism design model of ￿nancial intermediation similar to Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) and closest to Allen and Gale (2004). The economy lasts three periods (t = 0;1;2)
and is populated by a continuum of ex-ante identical agents, or investors.
There are two assets (technologies) in the model. The short asset is a storage technology that
returns one unit of consumption good at t + 1 for each unit invested at t. Investment in the long
asset has to be done at t = 0 to yield ^ R units of the consumption good at t = 2. Investors only
value consumption at dates 1 and 2 and receive a private idiosyncratic preference shock at the
beginning of date 1: We denote the preference shock by ￿ 2 ￿ = [￿L;￿H]. Investor￿ s preferences
are represented by a utility function u(c1;c2;￿), where ct denotes consumption at date t = 1, 2.
The utility function u(￿;￿) is assumed to be concave, increasing, and continuous for every type ￿.
We also assume a single crossing property:







In the paper we are primarily interested in studying three types of preferences: discount factor
shocks, liquidity shocks, and valuation-neutral shocks. We also provide a complete characterization
of the model for the fourth set of preference described in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and used in
Jacklin (1987).
Example 1 Discount factor shocks: u(c1;c2;￿) = ^ u(c1) + ￿^ u(c2):
In this case, agents di⁄er by how much they value second period consumption. The ￿rst feature
of these preferences is that a planner would like to allocate a relatively higher amount of second
period consumption to an agent with a higher shock ￿. The second feature of these preferences
is also important to our results. Consider two agents who are allocated the same consumption
c1 = c2 = ￿ c. An agent with higher ￿ would receive a higher lifetime utility of consumption from
such allocation. This feature of preferences creates an incentive for the planner to allocate, if
possible, a higher present value of consumption to the agent with higher ￿.
Example 2 Liquidity shocks: u(c1;c2;￿) =
1
￿
^ u(c1) + ^ u(c2):
7In this case, low ￿, i.e., a high liquidity shock, is a shock that makes consumption at date
1 particularly valuable. Similar to the case of the discount shocks, the second feature of these
preferences is that an agent with lower ￿ has a higher lifetime utility of consumption than an agent
with lower ￿.6
Up to now, we have modelled liquidity and discount shocks as preferences shocks, or in other
words, consumption opportunity shocks. We now discuss how we can think of the model as an
environment in which ￿rms or entrepreneurs face investment opportunity shocks. The outline of









for some common discount factor ￿: Agents are committed to ￿nance a ￿xed size ￿normalized to 1 ￿
investment opportunity paying out
~ R
^ ￿
at date 2 and learn their type at date 1: It can be easily shown




Imagine now that an entrepreneur is committed to ￿nance a project with a known return ￿












: We can therefore interpret agents receiving taste shocks as investors receiving
investment opportunity shocks.











￿￿ ^ u(c1) +
￿
￿




￿￿ ^ u(c2): (1)
If ^ u(c) = log(c), then
u(c1;c2;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ u(c1) + ￿^ u(c2):
In this case, agents di⁄er in how valuable their consumption is across periods, but the second
feature of the preferences that we described above is absent here, and all agents value the lifetime
consumption stream equivalently. Note that in the case of the log utility, there is no need to
normalize preferences by ^ R, and valuation-neutral preferences do not depend on technology.
6A natural question arises whether uility speci￿cation of liquidity shocks
1
￿
^ u(c1) + ^ u(c2) is a renormalization of
the discount shocks ^ u(c1) + ￿^ u(c2), and that by dividing utility in the case of discount shocks by ￿ we would arrive
to the model with liquidity shocks. It is true that both of preferences have the same marginal rates of substitutions.
However, the preferences are di⁄erent in the direction of the levels of lifetime levels of utilities. In the case of liquidity
shocks, it is low ￿ that gives an agent a higher lifetime value of consumption. In the case of dicount factor shocks, it
is exactly the opposite ￿high ￿ leads to high lifetime value of consumption.
8Example 4 Diamond-Dybvig preferences. Let ￿ 2 f0;1g and 1 > ￿ > ^ R￿1:
U(c1;c2;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)u(c1) + ￿￿u(c1 + c2):
In the case of Diamond-Dybvig preferences, agents are of two types: those who need to consume
in the ￿rst period, and those who are indi⁄erent between consuming in the ￿rst and the second
period.
We begin by assuming that there is no aggregate uncertainty. The timing of the events is as
follows. At t = 0, all individuals are (ex-ante) identical. At t = 1, each consumer gets an i.i.d.
draw of his type. The probability distribution of being an investor of type ￿ is denoted by F(￿).
We assume that the ￿law of large numbers￿holds, and that the cross-sectional distribution of types
is the same as the probability distribution F. One can, therefore, interpret F(￿) as the number of
agents of type below ￿. The realization of a consumer￿ s type is private information. Each consumer
has an endowment of e units of a consumption good at time t = 0, and no endowment at dates 1
and 2.
We denote byfc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g an allocation of consumption across consumers. An allocation is






dF (￿) ￿ e: (2)
We do not impose a sequential service constraint so there are no bank runs in our model. We
also restrict our attention to pure strategies. In what follows, we also consider symmetric equilibria.
4 Benchmark: equilibrium and constrained e¢ cient allocation with-
out private markets
In this section, we de￿ne and characterize a competitive equilibrium for the economy without
private markets for hidden trades. In this environment, agents are allocated with consumption
allocations depending on their types. Agents cannot engage in any unobservable transaction, and
their consumption is therefore observable.
4.1 De￿nition of equilibrium CE2
Consider a market with a continuum of intermediaries. We assume throughout the paper that all
activities at an intermediary level are observable. In period 0, before the realization of idiosyncratic
shocks, consumers deposit their initial endowment with the intermediary. An intermediary agrees
to provide a stream of consumption fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g. These contracts are o⁄ered competitively, and
there is free entry for intermediaries. Therefore, consumers sign a contract with the intermediary
that promises the highest ex-ante expected utility. We denote the equilibrium utility for a consumer











. There are no private markets in which consumers
can participate, and agents￿actual consumption is equal to the allocated consumption.
We assume that intermediaries can trade bonds b among themselves. Without aggregate uncer-
tainty the market for trades among intermediaries is very simple, and we describe it in this section
as it is useful for later extensions to the case of aggregate uncertainty. We denote by q the price of a
bond b in period t = 1 that pays one unit of consumption good in period 2. All intermediaries take
this price as given. They also pay dividends d1; d2 to its owners. At t = 0, the intermediary invests
x =
R




c2 (￿)dF (￿) in the long asset. We consider a
symmetric equilibrium.
The maximization problem of the intermediary that faces intertemporal prices q and the reser-
vation utility U is
max
c;d;y;b






dF (￿) + d1 + d2= ^ R + qb ￿ b= ^ R ￿ e; (4)
Z
u(c1 (￿);c2 (￿);￿)dF (￿) ￿ U ; (5)











In problem (3), an intermediary is maximizing pro￿ts subject to three constraints. Constraint
(4) is a budget constraint that requires that payments to consumers (c1 (￿);c2 (￿)), payments of
dividends (d1;d2), and net payments on bonds are feasible. Constraint (5) states that the expected
utility of an agent is higher than an equilibrium level of utility. Finally, constraint (6) is an
incentive compatibility constraint that states that an agent receives higher utility from truthfully
announcing his type ￿ rather than announcing any other type ￿0. In equilibrium, competition
among intermediaries forces them to have zero pro￿ts. We now de￿ne a competitive equilibrium.
De￿nition 1 A competitive equilibrium CE2 is a set of allocations fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g; a price q, div-
idends fd1;d2g; bond trades b, and a utility level U such that
(i) intermediaries choose ffc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g;fd1;d2g;bg to solve problem (3) taking q and U as
given;
(ii) consumers choose a contract that o⁄ers them the highest ex-ante utility;
(iii) the aggregate feasibility constraint (2) holds;
(iv) ￿rms make zero pro￿ts;
(v) bonds markets clear, b = 0.
It is easy to show that, in equilibrium, 1=q = ^ R and d1 = d2 = 0:
104.2 Characterization and relationship to an unconstrained problem SP 1 and to
a constrained e¢ cient problem SP 2
Intermediaries operate on competitive markets and, therefore, maximize an ex ante expected utility
of agents. We can immediately see that the problem of the intermediary (3) in a competitive




u(c1 (￿);c2 (￿);￿)dF (￿); (7)
s.t. feasibility (2) and incentive compatibility (6) hold.
Problem (7) is a de￿nition of a particular notion of constrained e¢ ciency which we denote by
SP2. In this problem, a planner receives reports from the agents of their types and provides a
menu of consumption allocations fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g to maximize expected utility of an agent subject
to incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints. The only informational friction that this
planner faces is unobservability of consumer types ￿.
The above result that constrained e¢ cient allocations coincide with the competitive equilibrium
does not mean that there is perfect risk sharing as the allocations in the problem SP2 have to
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints. It is useful to de￿ne an unconstrained problem SP1
in which types of agents are observable. In that program the social planner does not face any
constraints except for feasibility, i.e., maximizes the objective function in the problem (7) subject
to (2). Obviously, the problem of SP1 is weakly less restrictive than problem SP2. Therefore, the
welfare achieved in SP1 is weakly higher than welfare achieved in SP2.
We summarize characterization of the solution to the problem (7) and, therefore, the solution
of the problem (3) in the proposition that follows. The result is similar to Prescott and Townsend
(1984) and Allen and Gale (2004).
Proposition 1 (Optimum and competitive equilibrium with observable consumption)
Let c1 (￿) and c2 (￿) be equilibrium allocations in De￿nition 1. Then competitive equilibrium CE2
is constrained e¢ cient, i.e., solves problem SP2. Moreover, 8 ￿ 2 ￿ :
1. If preferences are discount shocks, as in the example 1; b u0(c1 (￿)) ￿ ^ R￿b u0(c2 (￿));
2. If preferences are liquidity shocks, as in the example 2; b u0(c1 (￿)) ￿ ^ R￿b u0(c2 (￿));
3. If preferences are valuation-neutral shocks, as in the example 3, ￿b u0(c1 (￿)) = ^ R(1 ￿ ￿) b u0(c2 (￿));
Proof. In the appendix.
The intuition for the wedge in parts 1 and 2 of the above proposition is as follows. Consider,
for example, the case of liquidity shocks. An agent with a low liquidity shock, high ￿, has an
incentive to report a high liquidity shock, low ￿, to receive a higher consumption in period 1. A
wedge (implicit tax) between the ￿rst and the second period consumption relaxes the incentive
constraint by making such deviations more costly. We can contrast the result above with the case
11where the shocks are public information, the solution to the problem SP1. In that case, there is
no intertemporal wedge, and the Euler equation holds with equality. The case of the valuation-
preferences in Part 3 of the proposition is special as the incentive compatibility constraint (6) does
not bind. For such preferences, the solution to the problem SP1 coincides with the solution to the
problem SP2, and there is no wedge in the intertemporal valuation for all types.7
5 Competitive equilibrium with private markets
The allocations described in the previous section may not be achieved if agents can engage in
transactions on markets. Allen (1985) and Jacklin (1987) were the ￿rst to point out that the
possibility of such trades may restrict or even lead to a complete elimination of risk sharing. In this
section we de￿ne and characterize a competitive equilibrium allocation in the presence of private
markets.8 We ￿rst argue, as in Jacklin (1987) and Allen and Gale (2004), that without regulations
￿nancial intermediaries provide no risk sharing. Unlike the previous literature we then identify a
precise reason for the absence of insurance, an externality, that, as we show in the sections that
follow, can be corrected by liquidity regulations.
5.1 Private market
We model unobservability of consumption using the setup of private markets as follows. Con-
sider an environment in which all consumers have access to a market in which they can trade
assets among themselves unobservably9. Formally, suppose that consumers are o⁄ered a menu of
contracts fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g. We model private markets as an endowment economy where endowments
are allocations that agents receive (possibly by misrepresenting their types). A consumer treats
the contract and the equilibrium interest rate R on the private market as given and, given his








. Unlike in the environment without private markets, actual after-trade consump-
tion fx1 (￿);x2 (￿)g may di⁄er from the consumption speci￿ed in the contract, since it is impossible
to preclude a consumer from borrowing and lending the amount s(￿) on the private market. It can
be easily shown that a consumer trades only a risk free security s(￿) and solves:
7Note that not every utility function of the form ￿^ u(c1)+(1 ￿ ￿) ^ u(c2) would imply that the incentive compatibility




1 =(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)c
1￿￿
2 =(1 ￿ ￿);
the solution of the problem SP
2 would feature a wedge in the intertemporal valuation, and the incentive compatibility
constraint would bind.
8An alternative interpretation of the assumption of the private markets is non-exclusivity by which we mean that
it is impossible for an intermediary to observe or control transactions of a consumer with other intermediaries.
9All our analysis is easily extended to the case in which agents can trade not only among themselves but also with
other intermediaries. This case would bring this model closer to an interpretation as an environment of non-exclusive
contracts. Key assumption that allows us to extend our results to that case is that portfolios of the intermediary
(investment in short and long assets) are observable while transactions with individual consumers are not observable.
Our choice of modelling side trades as private markets allows us to economize on notation without a⁄ecting the
substance of the results.
12max
x1(￿);x2(￿);s(￿);￿0 u(x1 (￿);x2 (￿);￿); (8)
s.t. 8i:








We denote the value of this problem by ~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g;R;￿). We denote by ￿0 (￿) the re-
porting strategy that the agent chooses in the problem above.
An equilibrium in the private market requires that in each period the total endowment of
























dF (￿) determine the interest rate R. We
now de￿ne equilibrium in the private market.
De￿nition 2 An equilibrium in the private market given the pro￿le of contracts fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g con-
sists of an interest rate R; and, for each agent ￿: strategies ￿0 (￿), and allocations fx1 (￿);x2 (￿);s(￿)g
such that
(i) consumers solve problem (8) taking ffc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g;Rg as given;
(ii) the feasibility constraints on the private market (11) are satis￿ed.
We assume that for any menu of contract fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g that is o⁄ered there exists a unique
equilibrium.
5.2 Competitive equilibrium with private markets CE3
In the presence of private markets, intermediaries need to take into account, in addition to un-
observable types, that consumers are able to engage in transactions in the private market. Each
intermediary chooses payments fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g; pays dividends d1; d2, and trades bonds b with other
intermediaries. It is important to note that intermediaries take the interest rate on the private mar-
ket R as given. The maximization problem of the intermediary that faces an intertemporal price
q, a price on the private market R, and a reservation utility U is
max
c;d;y;b






dF (￿) + d1 + d2= ^ R + qb ￿ b= ^ R ￿ e; (13)










~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g;R;￿)dF (￿) ￿ U : (15)
The ￿rst constraint in the intermediary￿ s problem is the budget constraint. The second con-
straint is incentive compatibility that states that, given interest rates R, consumers choose to
truthfully reveal their types. The last constraint states that the intermediary cannot o⁄er a con-
tract which delivers a lower expected utility than the equilibrium utility U from the contracts
o⁄ered by other intermediaries. In equilibrium, all intermediaries act identically and make zero
pro￿ts. The intermediary￿ s problem in this economy is very similar to that in the economy with
observable trades. The only di⁄erence comes from the fact that the incentive constraint (14) takes
into account side trades that are not observable. The de￿nition of the competitive equilibrium is
parallel to that in the economy with observable trades.
De￿nition 3 A competitive equilibrium CE3 is a set of allocations fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g; a price q, div-
idends fd1;d2g; bond trades b, utility U, and the interest rate on the private market R such that
(i) intermediaries choose ffc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g;fd1;d2g;bg to solve problem (12) taking q; R; and U
as given;
(ii) consumers choose the contract that o⁄ers them the highest ex-ante utility;
(iii) the aggregate feasibility constraint (2) holds;
(iv) the private market, given the menus fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g, is in equilibrium, and R is an equilib-
rium price;
(v) ￿rms make zero pro￿ts;
(vi) bonds markets clear, b = 0.
First, we show a straightforward lemma that the incentive compatibility constraint (14) takes
the form of equalizing present value of intertemporal allocations across periods because, otherwise,
an agent would pretend to claim a type that gives a higher present value of allocations and engage
in trades on the private markets to achieve desired consumption allocations.












for any ￿, ￿0. (16)
Let us rewrite the problem of the intermediary in a more manageable form by considering
its dual, simplifying incentive compatibility constraint using Lemma 1, and using the fact that




u(c1 (￿);c2 (￿);￿)dF (￿); (17)





dF (￿) ￿ e: (18)
14It is easy to see that the interest rates on the markets for trades among intermediaries must be
equal to the return on the production technology, so that 1=q = ^ R. We now argue that R = ^ R;
otherwise, arbitrage opportunities are created. For example, suppose that R < ^ R, i.e., an interest
rate on the private market is lower than R. An intermediary then chooses to invest only in the
long asset and sets
R c2 (￿)
^ R
dF (￿) = e and
R
c1 (￿)dF (￿) = 0. Consumers then can borrow on
the private market at the interest rate R that is lower than the technological rate of return ^ R
available to the intermediary. Therefore, the only price that can be an equilibrium price is R = ^ R
so that intermediaries do not engage in arbitrage. We can summarize this reasoning in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 (Absence of risk-sharing without regulations) Let R￿ denote equilibrium
price on the private market corresponding to the competitive equilibrium in De￿nition 3. Then
R￿ = ^ R: The only allocation that competitive markets can achieve in such an economy is an













for any ￿, ￿0.
This proposition implies that there is complete absence of risk sharing as in Jacklin (1987) and
Allen and Gale (2004). There are two important concepts that this proposition summarizes. The
￿rst is that the incentive compatibility constraints (arising because of unobservability of types and
possibility of trades) lead to equalization of present values of consumptions evaluated at the interest
rate on the private market R. The second fact is that arbitrage among competitive intermediaries
forces the equilibrium interest rate on the private market to be equal to the return on savings ^ R.
Intuitively, the reason that the competitive equilibrium achieves only an autarcic allocation is
an externality. Intermediaries do not take into account how the contracts o⁄ered to its investors
a⁄ect the return on trades and thus incentives to reveal information truthfully for consumers of
other intermediaries. Individual intermediaries can not internalize this e⁄ect. Competition between
di⁄erent intermediaries implies that interest rates at which consumers trade are equated to ^ R. The
interpretation of our result is di⁄erent from Jacklin (1987) and Allen and Gale (2004) as we describe
it as an externality that we show in the next section can be corrected by a government intervention.
6 Optimal liquidity requirements
In this section we show that there exists an intervention ￿a liquidity requirement ￿imposed on
intermediaries that improves upon the competitive equilibrium allocation. We then determine
the best (optimal) liquidity requirement. We show how the form of the optimal liquidity adequacy
depends on the nature of the shocks that agents experience. Finally, we show that the best liquidity
requirement implements a particular notion of constrained e¢ cient allocations. The key concept
in this section is that a manipulation of liquidity leading to changes in the interest rate on private
15markets, may lead to an improvement of risk sharing even in the presence of trading possibilities
by agents contrasting with the results of Jacklin (1987) and Allen and Gale (2004).
6.1 De￿nition and e⁄ects of a liquidity requirement
A liquidity requirement is a constraint imposed on all intermediaries, i.e., a constraint on the
problem (12) that requires that investment in the short asset for any intermediary should be higher







We call a liquidity requirement a liquidity cap if (19) is imposed with less or equal sign. A
liquidity cap stipulates the maximal amount of the short asset that an intermediary can hold. We
call a liquidity requirement a liquidity ￿oor if (19) is imposed with a greater or equal sign. A
liquidity ￿ oor stipulates the minimal amount of the short asset that an intermediary can hold. An
attractive feature of the liquidity requirement is that it does not require a regulator to observe
individual contracts c1 (￿) ￿only an aggregate portfolio allocation of the intermediaries needs to
be observed.
We now intuitively describe the e⁄ects that a binding liquidity requirement has on the interest
rate on private markets. Let ^ c1 (￿) be the allocation of consumption that arises in an equilibrium
without government intervention in De￿nition 3. Suppose that a liquidity ￿ oor i is set higher than
the amount of aggregate liquidity provided by competitive markets:
i > ^ {;
where ^ { =
R
^ c1 (￿)dF (￿). When a liquidity ￿ oor is imposed, the aggregate endowment in the




is equal to i rather than ^ {. Recall that private
trading markets in which agents participate after receiving their allocation from the intermediaries
are an endowment economy. The liquidity ￿ oor increases the ￿rst period aggregate endowment in
the private market (and, correspondingly, decreases the second period endowment) and, therefore,
lowers the interest rate R such that R < ^ R. Imposing a binding liquidity cap has the opposite e⁄ect
as it lowers the ￿rst period aggregate endowment and, therefore, increases R such that R > ^ R.
The mechanism by which a liquidity requirement a⁄ects the interest rate on the private markets
is a key to understanding the main idea behind how our model works. In the absence of regulations,
it is impossible for the interest rate R on the private market to di⁄er from ^ R. As we showed in
Proposition 2, an intermediary would engage in arbitrage and would not internalize possible adverse
e⁄ects that such arbitrage has on the provision of incentives and risk-sharing in the economy. The
liquidity requirement puts a limit on the minimal (maximal) ￿rst period payments (liquidity) an
intermediary can make and limits arbitrage by intermediaries.
Why may it be the case that, for example, a decrease in the private market interest rate (that
16corresponds to a binding liquidity ￿ oor i > ^ {) improves welfare and risk sharing? There are two
e⁄ects of decreasing the private market interest rate. First, it is clear that a decrease in R below ^ R
decreases welfare as it introduces an intertemporal wedge in the marginal utilities of agents. There
is also a second e⁄ect. Recall that unobservability of agents￿types and possibility of trades require
that agents of various types receive the same present value of consumption evaluated at the private













For a given level of the present value of consumption, a regulator has a policy instrument ￿changing














A change in the interest rate leads to a relative redistribution of resources from the ￿rst to the
second period which may bene￿t an agent who derives a higher utility from a given present value
of consumption streams and lead to an improvement in the ex-ante welfare. Competitive markets
lack this additional instrument because of arbitrage and the fact that each individual ￿rm cannot
set the interest rate. A regulator, however, can a⁄ect the interest rate and achieve allocations
better than autarcic allocations achieved by the markets. We show next how the exact form of
the liquidity requirement and a corresponding direction of the private market interest rate change
depend on the form of agents￿preferences.
6.2 Optimal liquidity regulations
We ￿rst simplify the problem of characterizing an equilibrium with a liquidity adequacy require-
ment. Let








be the ex-post indirect utility of an investor of type ￿ if her income is I, and the interest rate on the
private market is R. Denote by xu
1(I;R;￿) and xu
2(I;R;￿) the uncompensated demand functions
in this problem.
It is easy to see that the problem of ￿nding an optimal liquidity requirement is to choose the





V (I;R;￿)dF (￿) (22)







dF (￿) ￿ e; (23)





is the ex-post market value of allocations. Note that the incentive
compatibility that requires an agent not to misrepresent his type and not to engage in the trades on
private markets implies that the same net present value of allocations, I, evaluated at the interest
rate R has to be given to agents of di⁄erent types ￿ as, otherwise, an agent would always prefer to
claim a higher income.
We now analyze two key ￿rst order conditions that characterize problem (22). Consider the










dF￿ = 0; (24)










dF￿ = 0; (25)
where we denote by ￿ a multiplier on (23), by xu
1;I and xu
2;I the derivatives of the uncompensated
demands with respect to I, and by xu
1;R and xu
2;R derivatives of uncompensated demands with
respect to R.
We manipulate these conditions (proof in the appendix) to obtain a characterization of the
optimal wedge between the interest rate on the private market and the return on savings.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Wedge) Let I￿ and R￿ be solutions to the problem of ￿nding the optimal

























2;R is a compensated demand in problem (22).
Formula (26) characterizes the optimal wedge between the interest rate R and the rate of
return on savings ^ R in terms of easily interpretable parameters such as indirect utility functions,
uncompensated and compensated demands and the properties of the distribution of shocks. This
formula also provides intuition for the result that we prove next that relates the form of the shocks
that agents experience to the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement.
First, we describe the intuition for the form of the numerator of the wedge in equation (26).
Consider ￿rst the case of liquidity shocks. The regulator wants to allocate a higher amount of
lifetime consumption to agents with a higher lifetime value of income, i.e., to those with lower
￿, implying that VI;￿(I;R￿;￿) < 0. An agent with low ￿, for a given level of income I, prefers
a lower consumption in the second period. The covariance between VI(I;R￿;￿) and xu
2(I;R￿;￿),
is, therefore, negative. The intuition for this case is as follows. For a given level of income, a
decrease in the interest rate allows agents with low ￿ to consume more in the ￿rst period and
18yield a higher lifetime value. We show in the Theorem that follows that an interest rate R￿ < ^ R
allows the regulator to allocate more resources to agents with higher consumption opportunities.
A simpler and less technical intuition is that of controlling a joint deviation: a deviating agent
wants to pretend to have lower ￿ and then save to consume in period two a larger amount than a
truth-telling agent. A decrease in the interest rate, therefore, negatively a⁄ects a deviating agent
more than a truth-telling agent and relaxes incentive constraints.
The interpretation of the numerator in (26) for the case of discount shocks is similar. The
planner￿ s value of income is higher for agents with a higher ￿ who prefer to consume their endowment
in the second period, therefore, the covariance in the numerator is positive. The intuition for this
case is as follows. For a given level of income, an increase in the interest rate allows agents with
high ￿ to consume more in the second period and yield a higher lifetime value. We show in the
Theorem that follows that an interest rate R￿ > ^ R, therefore, allows the regulator to allocate more
resources to agents with better consumption opportunities. As in the case of liquidity shocks a
simpler intuition is that of controlling a joint deviation: a deviating agent wants to pretend to have
higher ￿ and then borrow to consume in period two a larger amount than a truth-telling agent. An
increase in the interest rate, therefore, negatively a⁄ects a deviating agent more than a truth-telling
agent and relaxes incentive constraints.
For the case of the valuation-neutral preferences the intuition is simple, as, at the optimum
with observable consumption, agents do not want to retrade, hence, the optimum with and without
unobservable consumptions coincide.
Now we turn our attention to the denominator of (26). It is clear that xc
2;R(I;R;￿) > 0 ￿a stan-








is a priori indeterminate, even under the assumption that VI(I;R;￿) > 0 or VI;￿(I;R;￿) < 0. More-











is also indeterminate. We now make an assumption that allows us determine the sign of the wedge
in (26) and then show this assumption holds in two natural cases.












The lemma that follows shows two natural cases in which Assumption 2 holds.
Lemma 2 Assumption 2 holds under the conditions that follow.
1. Preferences are homothetic.
192. The variance of the shocks is small. Consider a family of distributions fF￿g indexed by
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 with support in [￿L;￿H]: Suppose that F￿(￿;z) is continuous in (￿;￿): Suppose that
lim
￿!0
￿F￿ = 0 where ￿F￿ is the variance of F￿: Then there exists 1 > ￿ ￿ > 0 such that for all
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0; assumption 2 holds.
Proof. In the appendix.
Now we use Assumption 2 and Proposition 3 to derive a theorem that characterizes the optimal
liquidity adequacy requirement.
Theorem 1 (Optimal liquidity adequacy requirements) Let R￿ be the interest rate associ-




c1 (￿)dF (￿) be the amount of liquidity (￿rst period consumption) provided in the




1 (￿)dF (￿) be the amount of liquidity
(￿rst period consumption) provided in the solution to the problem of ￿nding the optimal liquidity
adequacy requirement de￿ned in (22).
1. If preferences are of the discount shock form as in example 1; R￿￿ ^ R > 0: The optimal liquidity




2. If preferences are of liquidity shock form as in example 2; R￿ ￿ ^ R < 0: The optimal liquidity




3. If preferences are valuation-neutral shocks, then R￿ = ^ R. No regulations are needed. More-
over, the solution to the optimal problem SP2 without private markets, solution to the problem
of the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement (22), and the solution to the competitive equi-
librium with private markets CE3 coincide.
Proof. In the appendix.
Theorem 1 is one of the central results of the paper and provides a characterization of the
optimal liquidity adequacy requirement and the associated interest rate on the private markets
depending on the nature of the shocks (liquidity or discount factor shocks) that agents experience.
The theorem states the form of the optimal liquidity requirement and shows that competitive
markets for liquidity are ine¢ cient. Importantly, we show that whether markets provide too little
liquidity and too much investment in the long asset (as in the case of liquidity shocks) or too much
liquidity and too little investment in the long asset (as in the case of discount shocks) depends on
the structure of the environment, speci￿cally, on the form of shocks a⁄ecting agents.
The technical reason for the failure of the welfare theorem that we proved in Theorem 1 is
an externality that each ￿nancial intermediary faces. When intermediaries allocate consumption
20to agents, they do not take into account how such allocations a⁄ect interest rates on the private
market. We can see that the interest rate enters the production set of each intermediaries in
equation (14). An imposition of a liquidity regulation and a corresponding change in the private
market interest rate partially corrects such externality and leads to improvement in welfare. This
externality can be called a "pecuniary externality" as it operates through price (interest rate) on
the private markets. The reason why such an externality has e⁄ects on the welfare is because our
environment is that of private information.10
6.3 Optimal liquidity adequacy requirements implements the social optimum
with retrading SP 3
A natural question arises after reading the previous section whether the optimal liquidity adequacy
requirement is the best regulation within a particular class of regulations (i.e., within the class
of liquidity adequacy requirements). It may be the case that there exists another, perhaps more
complicated, regulation scheme that achieves superior allocations given constraints imposed by
unobservability of types and possibility of hidden trades. In this section, we show that a competitive
equilibrium with optimal liquidity requirement implements the constrained e¢ ciency that we call
SP3, i.e., achieves the highest possible welfare given these two informational frictions.
We ￿rst formally de￿ne the constrained e¢ cient problem SP3. Consider a social planner that
cannot observe or shut down trades on private markets and cannot observe agents￿types. The
di⁄erence with the problem SP2 is that, in addition to the private information faced by SP2,
planner SP3 faces constraints that agents may trade on the private market. The social planner
SP3 chooses the allocations fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g that maximize the ex ante utility of consumers. The
revelation principle shows that, without loss of generality, the social planner can o⁄er a contract
fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g so that all consumers choose to report their types truthfully to the planner and do
not trade on the private market. It is easy to show that the social planner can a⁄ect the return on
trades among agents by allocating di⁄erent amount of aggregate consumption across time.




u(c1 (￿);c2 (￿);￿)dF (￿); (28)
s.t. Z ￿
c1 (￿) + c2 (￿)= ^ R
￿
dF (￿) ￿ e; (29)
u(c1 (￿);c2 (￿);￿) ￿ ~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g;R;￿); (30)
where R is the equilibrium interest rate on the private market, given the pro￿le of endowments
fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g.
10Allen and Gale (2004) results of whether intermediaries underprovide or overprovide liquidity compared to the
optimum depends on the degree of risk aversion of consumers. Our result on private intermediaries underproviding or
overproviding liquidity does not depend on the degree of risk aversion and depends only on the structure of shocks.
21It is important to note two features of the incentive compatibility constraint (30). First, it is at
least as tight as the constraint with observable consumption (6). The reason is that the planner has
to ensure that, in addition to truthful revelation of types, consumers do not engage in trades on the
private markets. Second, the right hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint depends on
the whole vector of endowments fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g for all consumers in the economy, not just for the
individual consumer ￿. We showed that the interest rate actually depends on the relative amount
of aggregate consumption provided by the planner in the ￿rst period versus the aggregate amount
of consumption provided in the second period.
We now show that the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement is the best regulation that can
be achieved given the informational frictions of unobservability of types and trades among agents.
The theorem that follows proves that our focus on just one class of regulations ￿liquidity adequacy
requirements ￿is not restrictive.
Theorem 2 (Optimal liquidity requirement is e¢ cient) The optimal liquidity adequacy re-
quirement implements the constrained e¢ cient allocation which solves SP3, i.e. solutions to prob-
lems (22) and (28) coincide.
Proof. In the appendix.
Another important implication of this theorem is to provide comparison with previous results
derived in the environments with optimal taxation and private markets. An abstract treatment of
a related problem is given in Bisin, et.al. (2001) who show that, in a general class of environments
with anonymous markets, taxes can achieve Pareto improvement. The di⁄erence with our setup is
that they do not de￿ne the constrained e¢ cient problem SP3 but rather show that a local linear
tax can improve upon the market allocation. Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) study a dynamic model
of optimal taxation and do de￿ne the optimal program similar to our SP3. They also show that a
linear tax on savings locally improves upon the competitive equilibrium allocation. In their model,
in fact, it can be shown that a linear tax (locally optimal policy intervention) would not implement
the problem SP3. The question of the implementation of the problem SP3 in that model, or more
generally in a dynamic Mirrlees model with private trades, is still an open question. In our paper,
in contrast with Bisin, et.al. (2001) and with Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) we ￿nd the optimal,
rather than locally improving regulation. As we show below on the two important special cases
that we solve analytically, the welfare gain of ￿nding the optimal regulation may be signi￿cant.
6.4 Two closed-form examples
The results derived in Theorem 1 provide a general characterization of the form of optimal liquidity
requirement depending on the form of the preferences. In this section we consider two cases for
which we derive a closed form characterization of the optimum that further characterizes the optimal
liquidity requirement in terms of underlying parameters. The ￿rst case is an example in which the
utility of consumption is logarithmic. The second case is an environment of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983).
226.4.1 Log case
We further extend Proposition 3 and Theorem 1 by providing a closed form solution for the case
of a logarithmic utility function. The reason why logarithmic utility allows a closed form solution
is because wealth and substitution e⁄ects of changing an interest rates cancel, and formulas for
compensated and uncompensated demands, indirect utility functions and their derivatives have an
easy algebraic form. With a more general utility function, equation (26) that provides an optimal
wedge between R and R￿ becomes more complicated and does not allow a closed form solution.
Assume preferences are of a form nesting those in examples 1; 2 and 3:
u(x1;x2;￿) = ￿1 log(x1) + ￿2 log(x2);
with ￿ = (￿1;￿2). Speci￿cally, for the case of discount shocks ￿1 = 1, ￿2 = ￿; for the case of liquidity
shocks ￿1 = 1=￿, ￿2 = 1; ; for the case of valuation-neutral shocks ￿1 = 1 ￿ ￿, ￿2 = ￿.
We leave the algebraic manipulations to the appendix and derive the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Closed form solution for the logarithmic case) Assume that ^ u = log(c).
Then the optimal liquidity requirement i￿ and the interest rate R￿ associated with it are given as
follows.
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3. If preferences are value neutral, R￿ = ^ R.
This proposition is important as it gives a complete closed form solution to the problem of
￿nding an optimal liquidity adequacy requirement. The interpretation of the solution is also simple.
Consider the formulas for R￿ for either the case of liquidity shocks of discount shocks. In the absence
of the second term, in these formulas the interest rate R￿ = ^ R. This second term measures the
value of the distortion introduced by private information and trades in the ￿nancial markets and
depends on the form of preferences and the distribution of shocks.
We also derived a closed form solution for the welfare gain of imposing the optimal liquidity
adequacy requirement as a Corollary to the Proposition above.
23Corollary 1 (Welfare gain of optimal liquidity adequacy requirement). If the utility func-
tion is logarithmic, the welfare gain of imposing optimal liquidity requirement, i.e., the di⁄erence
in ex-ante utility between the solutions to problem SP3 and CE3 is given as follows.













































Calculations such as the one above stress importance of ￿nding optimal rather than locally
improving regulations as the optimum can lead to signi￿cant welfare gain ￿.
6.4.2 Diamond-Dybvig preferences
In this section we provide a closed form solution to the optimal problem of ￿nding the optimal liq-
uidity adequacy requirement for the setup considered by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Jacklin
(1987). This environment is widely used in the literature on the ￿nancial intermediation. These
preferences are, however, special as the unconstrained solution (without private information) coin-
cides with the solution to the optimum with private information about agent￿ s types but without
private markets. In our notation, the solutions to SP1 and SP2 are identical. Jacklin (1987)
showed that when agents can freely engage in trades the competitive market allocation features
no risk sharing and has interest rate on the private market R equal to ^ R ￿this is analogue of
our Proposition 2 for the environment we considered. Jacklin (1987) and Allen and Gale (2004)
conclude that it is impossible to achieve any allocation other than the autarky. The new result
that we present here is that, for the case of the Diamond-Dybvig preferences, liquidity regulations
can improve upon competitive market allocation and, in fact, the solution with optimal liquidity
adequacy requirement coincides with the unconstrained allocation, SP1. We present an analytical
solution for such optimal regulation, the liquidity ￿ oor, and for the interest rate on the private
market associated with it.
Suppose there are two type of agents denoted by ￿ 2 f0;1g: Let ￿ be the fraction of agents of
type ￿ = 0: Preferences for agent of type ￿ are given by
U(c1;c2;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)u(c1) + ￿￿u(c1 + c2);
where u is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, increasing, strictly concave, and satis￿es Inada condi-
tions u0(0) = +1 and u0(+1) = 0: Also, we assume as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) that the
24coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is everywhere greater than 1
￿cu00(c)
u0(c)
￿ 1 for all c ￿ 0:
We start with the analysis of the benchmark problem in which there are no private markets analo-
gously to Section 4. It is easy to show that as in Proposition 1 the competitive equilibrium allocation
implements the constrained e¢ cient allocation without private markets. The constrained e¢ cient
allocation SP2 solves the following problem:





) + (1 ￿ ￿)(c1(1) +
c2(1)
^ R
) ￿ e; (32)
u(c1(0)) ￿ u(c1(1)); (33)
u(c1(1) + c2(1)) ￿ u(c1(0) + c2(0)): (34)
As noted by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the incentive compatibility constraints are not binding
at the optimum, so that the unconstrained allocation is attained, i.e., the allocation that we call
SP1 in which there is no private information, and incentive compatibility constraints (33) and
(34) are omitted. In other words, solutions to problems SP1 and SP2 coincide. This allocation is
characterized by
c2(0) = c1(1) = 0; (35)
￿ ^ Ru0(c2(1)) = u0(c1(0)); (36)




To verify that this allocation satis￿es incentive compatibility, we need only check that c2 (1) ￿ c1 (0),
which follows from ￿ ^ R > 1:
Now we turn to the analysis of the e⁄ects of private markets that is similar to our Section 5.
First, consider competitive equilibrium with private markets. Reasoning paralleling that in the
Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium interest rate on the private markets is equal to ^ R and
that no risk sharing is achieved: agents￿ s present value of consumption evaluated at the interest
rate ^ R is equated across di⁄erent types. This is a result shown by Jacklin (1987).
We show that optimal liquidity requirement allows to change the interest rate on the private
market, implements the optimal program SP3 which in turns coincides with the unconstrained
optimum SP1 and with constrained e¢ cient allocation with private types but no hidden trades.
The analysis closely follows Section 6.2 and proofs of Proposition 3 and Theorem 1. In the appendix,
we provide the algebra that gives the closed form solution for the optimal interest rate R￿ as a












￿ ￿ ￿ ^ R = 0 (38)
We can implement the solution with a ￿ oor i￿ on the holdings of short term assets given by
i￿ =
e
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)R￿
^ R
: (39)
Moreover, in the case u(c) = log(c); we have R = ￿ ^ R: We collect the results of this section in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Closed form solution for the Diamond-Dybvig case) Consider the setup
of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
1. The equilibrium interest rate on the private market is Rce = ^ R. Competitive market allocations
with private markets are ine¢ cient. Markets underprovide liquidity.
2. Optimal liquidity ￿oor i￿, given by (39), implements the optimal unconstrained allocation
SP1.
(a) The interest rate associated with such optimal liquidity regulation is given by (38).
(b) If the utility function is logarithmic, then the interest rate associated with the optimal
liquidity regulation is given by R￿ = ￿ ^ R.
Proof. In the appendix.
The intuition behind this proposition highlights the key forces behind our model. Consider
the case of logarithmic utility. In the competitive market, the only possible equilibrium interest
rate on the private market is R = ^ R as each individual ￿nancial intermediary would engage in
arbitrage if R were di⁄erent from ^ R. The competitive equilibrium allows no risk sharing as the
possibility of engaging in trades on ￿nancial markets leads to equalization of incomes I of agents
of di⁄erent types, and these incomes are evaluated with the interest rate ^ R. Now consider how the
competitive market allocation can be improved. Imposing a liquidity ￿ oor increases the amount
of ￿rst-period endowment on the private market and decreases the interest rate R < ^ R. This
relaxes incentive compatibility constraints. A short, nontechnical intuition is as follows. Consider
a possible deviation in this model: an agent of type 1 can claim to be an agent of type 0 and then
save to consume in the second period. At the interest rate R = ￿ ^ R, an agent of type 1 does not
￿nd it pro￿table to engage in such deviation.11
It is easy to calculate the welfare gain of imposing the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement.
11Caballero and Krishanmurthy (2003) and Lorenzoni (2006) derive a similar result in their environment.
26Corollary 2 (Welfare gain of optimal liquidity adequacy requirement). Consider the setup
of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). If the utility function is logarithmic, the welfare gain of imposing
optimal liquidity requirement, i.e., the di⁄erence in ex-ante utility between the solutions to problem
SP3 and CE3, is given by
￿ = ￿ log
￿
1
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿log
￿
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
:
This corollary again stresses the importance of studying optimal rather than local liquidity
adequacy requirements as potential welfare gains can be quite large.
7 Extensions
In this section we consider three extensions of the model described above: introducing aggregate
shocks, modelling an environment with idiosyncratic shocks to ￿nancial intermediaries, and con-
sidering direct access to intertemporal technology by agents.
7.1 Aggregate shocks
It is easy to extend the model to the case in which the economy experiences aggregate shocks to e
and ^ R that are known in period t = 0. Suppose that there are N aggregate states ￿ = f1;2;::;Ng
and the state is observable. We denote the probability of these states occurring as ￿(￿). We notice
that it is technologically impossible for the society to transfer resources across aggregate states.
Therefore, the problem with aggregate shocks can be reduced to solving N independent problems
described in case without aggregate shocks and is, essentially, a comparative statics exercise.
The case of the logarithmic utility is again the simplest case that allows us to completely char-
acterize the solution. Consider equations (64) and (65). An aggregate shock either to endowment
e or to the return ^ R can be studied as comparative statics with respect to e and ^ R.
We can easily see that for the case of the aggregate endowment shocks, the interest rate on the
private market does not depend on the realization of the aggregate shock ￿R￿ (￿) is constant. Let￿ s
de￿ne by liquidity requirement in a ratio form, ir (￿), a constraint on a problem of a competitive ￿rm




=e for the realization of the aggregate shock ￿; and R￿ (￿) de￿ne corresponding
interest rate on the private market. Then i￿
r (￿) is constant for all ￿. In fact, it is easy to show that
this result also holds for the utility ^ u(c) = c1￿￿￿1
1￿￿ : The case of the shocks to the rate of return is
equally simple. It is easy to show that i￿
r (￿) and R￿ (￿)= ^ R(￿) are constant for all ￿:
7.2 Idiosyncratic shocks to intermediaries and interbank markets
In this section we discuss an extension of the model to the case in which intermediaries experience
idiosyncratic observable shocks. We show that if there are complete interbank markets then this
27model reduces to the case described in previous sections in which all intermediaries are identical.
The intuition for this result is simple: in period 0, intermediaries can trade bonds with the payo⁄
contingent on the shocks realized in period 1. We illustrate the result on the case without aggregate
uncertainty in which intermediaries face return shocks.
Formally, we proceed as follows. At time t = 1, an intermediary can face a rate of return shock
n 2 f1;:::;Ng with probability ￿n under which the return on the long asset is ^ R(n). We assume
that there is no aggregate uncertainty and that
X
n




At time 0 there are interbank markets in which intermediaries trade N Arrow securities. The
price of each security is qn. The security pays 1 if state n occurs and 0 otherwise. Prices qn are
determined by a market clearing condition. It is immediate to see that intermediaries choose to
fully insure themselves at t = 0 against idiosyncratic shocks. The problem of each intermediary
then reduces to the case of no idiosyncratic shocks described above.
7.3 Direct access to technology
Another variation of our setup would be the case in which some agents have access to technol-
ogy that yields ^ R directly without the need for ￿nancial intermediaries while other agents need an
intermediary to access the technology. If we modi￿ed our assumption that all activities at the inter-
mediary level is observable and instead supposed that a regulator could observe aggregate amount
of investment in the technology yielding ^ R, then our results would also hold. The constrained op-
timum in that model would be implemented by a linear tax on returns to investment of those who
can access the technology and by liquidity adequacy requirement on the ￿nancial intermediaries
serving liquidity needs of agents who can not access the technology.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we provided a novel theoretical mechanism how manipulation of aggregate liquidity
via regulation of ￿nancial intermediaries in the presence of markets can provide risk sharing while
competitive markets reach only autarcic allocations. A change in the interest rate on the private
markets that is generated by a liquidity requirement can be used as an instrument to improve
ex-ante welfare when agents have unobservable types and can trade in private markets. Moreover,
the best liquidity adequacy requirement is the best regulation as it implements the constrained
e¢ cient allocation subject to unobservable types and hidden trades. We provided a tight analytical
characterization of the problem of the optimal liquidity requirement and the optimal wedge between
the interest rate on the private market and the rate of marginal rate of transformation. A liquidity
28requirement is a simple tool that can be used by policymakers to regulate liquidity provision.
Depending on the types of shocks, liquidity or discount shocks, that agents or ￿rms in the economy
experience, we provide conditions under which the regulator should use either a liquidity cap or a
liquidity ￿ oor. Importantly, for a general speci￿cation of preferences, we derived a characterization
of the form of the optimal liquidity requirement and also provided closed form solutions for two
important cases.
9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1


















dF(￿) ￿ e: (43)
We assume that there is no bunching and drop constraint (42). In problem (40), attach multi-
pliers ￿￿ to (41), ￿ to (43) and form the following Lagrangian:
L =
Z ￿














Integrating by parts we can rewrite (44) as
L =
Z ￿















The ￿rst order conditions for c1(￿) and c2(￿) are












f￿ = 0: (46)





















































(1+￿￿)f￿ < 0 means that they bind upward. It is straightforward to show that incentive
constraints in (40) bind upward if preferences are as in example 1, and downward if preferences are
as in example 2: It is also easy to check that the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind
for the value neutral preferences.
9.2 Some properties of problem (20) used in the proofs
Denote by   the Lagrange multiplier on (21). The envelope theorem implies that:

































R2 = 0: (52)
9.3 Proof of Proposition 3













dF = 0: (53)
















































































































































































This proves the proposition.
9.4 Proof of Lemma 2






This implies, ￿rst, that date 2 consumption is a normal good, so that xu









￿ 0; which in turn implies assumption 2:
Part 2. Let K be a compact set containing the optimal values of (R;I) for 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0: Then















9.5 Proof of Theorem 1
























We now show a lemma that determines how VI(I;R￿;￿) depends on preferences.
32Lemma 3 VI;￿(I;R￿;￿) > 0 for all ￿; if preferences are discount factor shocks as in example 1.
VI;￿(I;R￿;￿) < 0 for all ￿; if preferences are liquidity shocks as in example 2; if preferences are
valuation-neutral shocks as in example 3, VI;￿(I;R￿;￿) = 0 for all ￿:
Proof. We have








Suppose ￿rst that preferences are given by u(x1)+￿u(x2): Then, substituting x1 using the budget
constraint, we can rewrite this problem as









By the Envelope theorem, we have
V￿(I;R;￿) = ^ u(xu
2(I;R;￿)):
Hence,
VI;￿ = ^ u0(xu
2(I;R;￿))xu
2;I(I;R;￿) > 0:
Suppose now that preferences are given by 1











For the value neutral preferences VI;￿ = 0.
This proves the Lemma.
9.6 Proof of Theorem 2
Note that the incentive compatibility constraint can be rewritten as
u(c1(￿);c2(￿);￿) ￿ ~ V (c1(￿0) +
c2(￿0)
R
;R;￿) for all ￿;￿0 in ￿
and in turn























Therefore, allocations that satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints are entirely characterized
by the following: there exists an equilibrium income level I such that for all ￿;
c1(￿) = xu
1(I;R;￿) and c2(￿) = xu
2(I;R;￿)
Of course the level of utility achieved ex post by an agent of type ￿ is then given by V (I;R;￿):
This proves the theorem.
9.7 Proof of Proposition 4






















We can rewrite the problem of ￿nding the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement (22) using
















dF￿ ￿ e: (61)
The ￿rst order condition for I and R; respectively, are given by
Z





















where ￿ > 0 is a multiplier on the resource constraint (61).
Manipulating these ￿rst order conditions we obtain the closed form solution for the interest rate











where E represent the expectation with respect to F (￿).
We can also ￿nd the optimal level of the liquidity requirement. Using feasibility to substitute



















We now substitute for the ￿1;￿2 for our three formulations of preferences and summarize the
closed form solution in the proposition that follows.
9.8 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the following consumption problem that gives the indirect utility of an agent who is
allocated with income I and who can trade on the private markets with the interest rate R :








Denote by (x1(I;R;￿);x2(I;R;￿)) the maximand of this problem.









) + (1 ￿ ￿)(x1(I;R;1) +
x2(I;R;1)
^ R
) ￿ e: (69)
We want to verify that the unconstrained allocation solving SP1 or SP2 is a solution to the
program (68) for the values of I and R de￿ned below. Consider the following system in (I;R)
u0(I) = ￿ ^ Ru0(RI); (70)
I =
e
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)R
^ R
: (71)
The result that (I;R) de￿ned in (70) and (71) satisfy the ￿rst order conditions of both (31) and
(68) follows immediately from the following observations.
V (I;R;0) = u(I); x1(I;R;0) = I; and x2(I;R;0) = 0;
35and if R ￿ 1
V (I;R;1) = ￿u(RI); x1(I;R;1) = 0; and x2(I;R;1) = RI;
and if R < 1
V (I;R;1) = ￿u(I); x1(I;R;1) = I; and x2(I;R;1) = 0:












￿ ￿ ￿ ^ R = 0 (72)
Denote by f(R) the left hand side of (72). Note that f (R) is increasing and f(1) = 1￿￿ ^ R < 0, so
that the solution to (70) and (71) involves R > 1: Now since the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion













which implies that f(￿ ^ R) ￿ 0; with equality if ^ u(c) = log(c): This concludes the proof that the
allocation SP1 coincides with the problem of ￿nding the optimal liquidity requirement for some
R 2 (1;￿ ^ R] and
I =
e
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